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1. Judicial Notiee. 
Respondent. 
Appellant, 
Respondent. 
He:,;pondents criticize appellants for calling to the 
attention of the Court the report of a Congressional 
Committee which embodied a report to such Committee 
by the Governmental Agency charged with the respon-
sibility of making the subsidy payments pursuant to 
the Act of Congress. 
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Appellants are not conscious of any impropriety in 
so <loing: 
'J'}J.is Honorable Court will take judicial notice of 
the trne :;lgnification of all English words and phrases, 
of th<: public and private official acts of the legislative, 
executive, and juclieial departments of the United States, 
and of the political history of the world. In all such 
cases "the Court may resort for its aid to appropriate 
hooks or documents of reference." Section 104-46-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
''The courts may also take notice of the mis-
chief the laws were intended to remedy and of the 
public demand preceding their passage, and they 
may, with propriety, recur to the history of the 
times when the statute was passed to ascertain 
the reason as well as the meaning of particular 
provisions therein ... '' 
(20 Am . .Tur. Evidence, ~ 41) 
'Phus in Outlet FJmbroidery Co. v. Derwent Mills, 254 
N. Y. 179, 70 A.L.R. 1440, the Court took judicial notice 
that at the time a contract for the sale of goods to be 
imported was entered into, Congress was debating a new 
tariff and that the debate continued for a year. 
In earlier cases involving subsidy payments thi:,; 
Honorable Court did take such notice of the actions 
tnl<en hy the government during the course of the last 
war, induding the premium payment plan. (Combined 
\l etals Reductions Co. v. State Tax Commission, 176 
P. 2d 614.) 
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2. An Argument Exploded. 
He1ipondent::> avoi<l rather than meet appellant:>' 
argnwents by reiterating the premise of the former s;;b-
;-:j,::~ ta.·~ c:1ses. stating (p. 10): 
"''' '' * T'hroughout tlw entire program, both 
before Hule 13 was amended and aft.erward, t1w 
premium payments were made as a part of the 
aetual total price authorizer! and pursuant to the 
premium price plan inaugnrated ,jointly by the 
Ft~deral Loan Agency, the \Y ar Production Board 
and the Office of Price Administration. ln other 
words, under O.P.A. regulations made in con-
junction wi.th the vVar Production Board the 
prices permitted to be paid for the metals were 
the ceiling prices plus the premium price. And 
the two of them together constituted the selling 
price of the ores and metals. The one was nevPr 
divorced from the other. * ~· * " (Italics ours.) 
One might think it strange for counsel to persist 
m this contention on the basis of the information now 
before the court in these cases, and the facts admitted 
to he true by the demurrers below. 
And when price controls were discontinued in 1945, 
while the subsidies continued into 1947, how can respond-
ents argne ''The one was never divorced from the 
other"? Not even a shadow of basis for this argument 
continued after metal price controls went out of the 
window. 
Respondents just beg the question in baldly assert-
mg (p. 10) that "the prices permitted to be paid for 
the metals were the ceiling prices plus the premium 
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price. And the two of them together constituted the 
selling price of the ores and metals.'' 
:1. The Basis For The Subsidies. 
Appellants have never advanced the "absurd" 
straw man that the subsidies-" so-calleu" by Congress 
whicl1 anthorizecl tl1Pir payment-~were "outright gifts." 
(P: 5, 7) 
On the contrary, appellants contend that the snh-
sidies paid were increased in direct ratio to the need of 
each particular mine for more money than could be rea-
lized from a sale or conversion into money or i:ts equiva-
lent of that mine's ores; they were paid, in the words of 
Congress, "to obtain the maximum necessary produc-
Y tion" from the mine\s of this country. 
It follows that since such subsidies are the opposite 
of 11roceeds from the sale of ores, and no part of the 
value thereof, the payments may not be considered "in 
arriving at a proper tax base." 
Respondents at page 7 of their brief momentarily 
recognize this when they aptly characterize such pay-
ments by quoting from a case in which one reason for 
the allo,wance of bounties was given as '' product:ion or 
manHfacture to be stimulated.'' 
4. Respondents' Considerati')n of Revised Rule 13. 
(P. 8) 
Original Rule 13 of the quota committee provided 
with respect to ores sold that premium payments would 
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be ''based upon metal paid for under settlement con-
trart:-; ". ( \V e assume the court will take judicial notice 
or the faet that in the eases where ores are sold, the 
:'a]p:-; are to lmyers under settlement contracts, i.e., con-
tract:-; ~-qwci fying the basis of settlement.) 
With respect to ores not so sold the rule provided 
that premium payments would be based on stated per-
eentages of the metal content. 
Tn the ease of Comhine1l Metals Redudion Co. et al 
\ ~- : :, tate Tax Couuaissiuu, this Honorable Court, look-
ing to the flrst part of the rule-that relating to ores 
solr1--said it was self-evident that metals were not paid 
for un(1er settlement contracts unless they were sold. 
'Then the court added that since it appears (from the 
records in those particular cases) that the "premium 
priees'' paid to mining companies were for metals sold 
h~- them, it followed that such premium prices were in-
clndablP as money received on a sale. The majority 
of the court felt that eases where ores were not so sold 
"-rre not then before this court. 
The decision of the court was accordingly based 
square!~- upon the quoted provision of Original Rule 13, 
f()r the eourt recognized that under our statute the basis 
for determining ·the amount of taxes due where there 
has heen a sale of ore under a bona fide contract of 
sale is the amount of money or its equivalent actually re-
ceived from the sale. 
From the records m these cases now before the 
eonrt involving ore sales it now appears that Original 
Rule 13 was rescinded, anrl a new rule adopted under 
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1\"]Jiel! subsidy payments were based on cert-ain stated 
j)i'rrentages for the ,rcspecti1:e metals regardless of the 
}Jcrccnta[JCS actually recovered or paid for. 
Copies of the original and revised rules are attached 
as f~Xl1ihits to the complaints. From these exhibits it 
appears that under the Revised Rule, even in the case of 
C'nstolll ores, payment of bounties was not "conditioned 
(,;: a sale'' ;-itinclt less \\·e1·e such bountie::.; '' rccci\·erl on 
a ;.;ale". 
He;.;pondents would have the court ignore the rescis-
sion of old rule 1:~ and the adoption of a new and differ-
ent rnle. 
On page 10 of their brief respondents now recog-
ni:~.e that under Original Rule l~ a different method of 
C'Ollljmting premium payments was provided whe.re no 
settlement contracts existed. Such method is set forth 
in the in;.;tructions of Metals Reserve Company attached 
as l<~xhibit D to the complaint ofthe United States Smelt-
ing Hefining and .Mining Company in Case No. 7324, 
which exhibit, together with the copie8 of affidavits at-
tached, show that bonuses ·were paid on the basis of 
mim~ produetion records and before any sale. 
In tlw same complaint it i8 alleged that such bonuses 
were paid unconditionally and without any right on the 
1mrt of the agency of the Federal Government paying 
the same to receive hack the premiums paid in the event 
the metals recovered from the ores for the production 
of which snch subsidies were paid became lost, de;.;troyed, 
were retained by the company or otherwise failed to 
enter the channels of commerce. Yet respondents ask 
the court to believe that such bonuses were received "on 
On the same page respondents say there is noth-
ill,'-(' to indicate that the purpose of making p1·emium 
payments was changed by Amended Rule lil. vVe agree: 
i/:c purpose of making such pa.yments was specified by 
C'ol!,rtress, i.e., to obtai.n the rnaxirnum necessary produc-
/ioN. 
The conditions of payment were, ho\Yever, within 
saw fit to rescind that part of Rule 1:l requiring as a 
eowlition of paylttent that certain ores be :o;old. H pre-
;;r;;·i)Ju1_ in lieu thereof thllt tk~ r:w1ntitie::; of metals 
}JI"O(i~tccd be deter1nined, a~ tlte bat;is for subsid~y pay-
The Kennecott and Similar Situations. 
Let us assume for this argument that Utah's statutes 
in question should be construed broadly against the tax-
pa~·er; and thus that the I .. egislature had in mind when 
it used the particular words in these statutes that pro-
eeed:,; or amounts realized from the sale of ores, etc., 
:,;lwul(1 inelude subsidies, bonuses or bounties, u)wn tied 
iuto tl1e purchase price for tlie sale of these ores. This 
apparently was the reasoning of the majority of the 
<'Ourt in the Combined Metals and Haynes decisions 
Jnu.;ed upon the records in the first series of cases sub-
l '1i tted to this court. 
Is this court now willing to press this line of rea-
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sonmg to the point of creating liability in cases such 
as that of Kennecott, where no sale of the ores, on the 
increased production of which the subsidies were com-
puted and paid, eve.r took place at all? 
In such cases the first part of Rule 13 never did 
apply, either as originally promulgated and heretofore 
relied on by this court, or after revision. Further, the 
reconls in these cases now before the court, with the 
material facts pleaded by appellants in cooperation with 
counsel for respondents and admitted by demurrer, 
show: 
(a) The precise basis on which the subsidies were 
paid. 
(b) That this basis was not the tons of ore :;old, 
but the excess-over-quota production of ore. 
(c) When the computations for subsidy payments 
on such basis were made each month, the payments 
occurred in due course entirely apart from the subse-
quent treatment and disposition of those excess ores. 
For example are the familiar Kennecott souvenir bee-
hives, where no sale has ever taken place even of the re-
fined copper. 
This indeed is a far cry from the other type of case 
where the same smelter, buying the ores, paid to the 
seller both the sales price and on behalf of the Govern-
ment the subsidy as a premium price, both computed 
on the same ores as (lelivercd and sold. If one is vvill-
ing to abrogate the familiar rule of strict construction 
in favor of the taxpayer, to assume a legislative pre-
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.:>c1ence anticipating then unknown conditions, and to 
look to the particular administrative restrictions and 
polil'ies in such cases rather than the intent of Congress 
in its authorization for the payment of production 
honm;es, then there is something to he said for tax lia-
bility in such cases. 
But even so-a position which we re8pectfully sub-
mit is in error-in the entirely different 8ituations 8Uch 
a8 tho8e of the United States Smelting Company and 
Kennecott, is not the court being asked to legislate judi-
cially under any standard, and frankly to rewrite these 
tax 8tatute8 in the interest8 of a pos8ible need for in-
creased revenue~ 
In their brief (p. 11) re8pondents do not and can-
not meet this; so they avoid the entire argument by say-
ing (1) these facts are "conclu8ions of law"; and (2) 
the affidavit attached to the complaint shows by the se-
lection of one word therein that the subsidy payments 
were for the sale of the ore8. 
\V e can only respectfully request the court to read 
the concise, simple amended complaint-in effect the 
(mtire record-in the Kennecott and similar cases, and 
then treat respondents' evasive agnun0nt on it8 merit. 
It is true that the one word of the particular affidavit 
attached to the Kennecott complaint a8 illustrative was 
not as otherwise throughout, changed from ''sold"; but 
if this court is to pin its decision on that point in view 
of the picture as otherwise pleaded and as was the fact, 
Kennecott is willing to let the matter rest on the con-
8CJences of those concerned. 
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6. The Inclusion of Subsidy Payments in Detennining 
Net Pmceeds Valuation. (P. 13) 
Although respondents so entitle the first subdivi-
f!ion or their hrief as to purportedly refer to the inclu-
sion of bonuses in determining the n1,ine occupation tax, 
it will he noted that often the argument is <lirected 
eqnall~' to such inclusion in arriving at net proceeds. \Ve 
l1ave follO\\'ed respondents in this, since in large part 
olwionsl;' U1e same rules are applicable. 
Under subdivision 2 of their brief, respondents make 
three points directed to the inclusion of premium pay-
ments in rleterrnining gross proceeds and thereby fixing 
the assesserl value of mines. These are as follows: 
n. "Under the Utah statutes the base for deter-
mining the taxes from mines includes what is annually 
reali11ed from the product of the mine, over and above 
the ('ost of expenses of obtaining· such proceeds and in-
rlu<les the value of the ore, etc., prodnce(l but not sold 
dclring· the year." 
1'his statement is obviously unwarranted in fact as 
a reference to the statute will readily disclose. Only 
when ores, produced hut not sold, have bPen conrerterl 
h1f o the PrJnivalent of money are they to be included in 
arriYing at net proceeds. 
The one case dealing with this is that of Salt Lake 
Connt~' vs. Utah Copper Co., 9:i Fed. 2d. 127, in which 
the question was whether "blister copper", gold and 
silver hull ion produced in the preceding calendar year 
lmt remaining unsold, as well as the amount received 
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t'rom ::;ales in the preceding calendar year of ores pro-
duced, should be included in computing gross proceeds. 
lt was not even contended that ores mined but not 
rn·oc<~:c;::-;e<l ::-;houl<l ::-;o he included. The Court held that 
such blister eopper and gold and silver bullion should 
he included, ::-;aying: 
" 'Blister enpper' i::-; eopper that has passed 
tiJrouglJ the• i'lllelting process, rnetallie copper of' 
a black hlistered surface, or final product of con-
Yertinp: copper mattP, and is about !)G-9D per cent 
pure. The simple meaning of' 'mom·~,, i:;; current 
coin, hut it ma~, mean possessions expressible in 
mone~, valnes. ':.\1 oney' lms no technical meaning, 
hnt is of mnhiguous import, and may l>e inter-
pret(~<l having reganl to all surrounding circum-
stancps under which it is used. ':.\foney' is often 
and popularly used as equivalent to 'property'. 
':M on<~.V' llleans \\'ealth reekoned in terms of 
mone:·; eapital considered as a eash asset; speci-
iienlly such wealth or capital dealt in as a com-
modit~, to he loaned, invested, or the like; wealth 
eonsidered as a ca::-;h asset. 'J;~quivalent' means 
equal in value, force, measure, power, and effect, 
or having equal or corresponding import, mean-
inr~, or l'ignificance; what is virtually the same 
tl1in~;: id(~nti(•al in effect.'~ * *" 
·' Bli:·der coprwr has an esiahlishefl and read-
ily ascertainable market value, and when the tax-
ing- authorities were apprisPd of the numher of 
JHmnrls produce<l it was a simple matter to ap-
praise its Yalue in money." 
The eases eited hy respondents arc not in point. The 
ease of Salt Lake County vs. Trtah Copper Co., 294 Fed. 
199, in whieh the case of :.\f ercur Mining Co. vs .. Tuah 
11 
County cited by respondents and other cases were re-
viewed and considered, held, to the contrary of respond-
ents' contention, that "the net annual proceeds of a mine 
are the net proceeds of the sale of its product during 
the tax year". 
In that case it was contended by the County that the 
statutes did not contemplate that tailings must be con-
verted into cash before the proceeds tax would attach; 
and the court held against the county. Yet this is the 
anthority eited by respondents. 
In the ease of Tintie f;tandard Mining Co. vs. Utah 
Count~·, cited hy respondents, the issue was as to the 
}ll'opriety of certain deductions from gross proceeds 
taken by the mining company and disallowed by the 
Board of IDqnalization. rrhe case did not involve any 
(jllPstion of the inclusion in gross proceeds of ores pro-
du('ed hut not sold. 
l1. Respondents next say that notwithstanding the 
alleQ:ations of the amended complaints here before the 
eourt, the cases must he considered as though the pre-
mimn payments were made only after the ores had been 
eom~erted into the equivalent o [ money. 
l{espon<lents ignore Uw specific allegations as to how 
these payments were made. For instance, in the case 
of rnited States Smelting Refining and Mining Com-
pan~·, No. 7i~24, is to be put aside: the exhibits showing 
the instructions from Metals Reserve Company; the 
monthl~· affidavits filed h~· the smelting company show-
ing that the quantities of metal reported as available 
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for the payment of premiums were determined by mine 
production records; the allegations as to the manner 
in which the ores were treated showing the processing 
at the plant of the company at Midvale, Utah, the ship-
ment of the resultant product for refining at other plants 
outside the State of Utah, and the date of payment of 
premiums with relation to such dates of processing and 
refining; also the allegations that the premiums were 
paid hefore 8ny sale of the ores, were paid uncondi-
tionally, and without any right on the part of the federal 
a~~ency paying the same to recover them or any part 
thereof in the event the ores were never sold. 
Respondents ignore all this to look only to an allega-
tion quoted at page 14 of their brief in which it was 
succintly stated that monthly quotas were computed and 
premiums were paid on a specified percentage of the 
metal contents of the qualified materials in the ores, and 
that such metal contents were determined by sampling 
and assaying hefore any conversion of the ores and be-
fore an~r processing of the ores other than such crush-
mg 1s as required to permit of sampling for assaying. 
This allegation respondents say is a mere "con-
elusion of law". The allegation is one of fact as to the 
time when certain things were done; it would be as 
much a conclusion of law to say that one had breakfast 
before having lunch. 
But respondents say that the very question to be 
determined here is whether or not there was a conver-
sion of ores into money or the equivalent of money. 
That is not the ultimate question to be determined: 
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the quet.ltion before this court is whether or not the 
honut.les paid were any part of the grost.l proceeds real-
ized from the sale or conversion into money or its equival-
ent of ores produced by appellants. "\Ve submit that under 
the admitted facts pleaded in these cases now before 
the court, it cannot seriously be contended that the sub-
sidies were any part of such gross proceeds. 
c. Finally, respondents argue that it is immaterial 
whether the oret.l were converted or sold; and "When 
the oret.l were taken out of the mine and were sent to 
the smelter or mill, such ores immediately had a value 
in addition to their ceiling price, namely, the amount 
which was payable for such ores as premium payments". 
( p. 17) 
Here again respondents simply beg the question as 
to whether the subsidies were some part of the payment 
made for the ores; or on the contrary were, as the Emer-
gen('y Price Control Act of 1942 authorized, as every rule 
issued (except one rescinded portion of original Rule 
13), and as every act done evidences, bonuses paid by 
Oovernment to ensure maximum production of certain 
fitrategic materials, paid because the amounts realizable 
from the particular operations of a particular mine were 
not sufficient to cover costs and ensure continued maxi-
nmm production. 
7. The Constitutional Question. (P. 19) 
l{espondents state that they are content to rest the 
que::-;tion of the constitutionality of the inclusion of 
premium payments in computing the net proceeds tax 
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valuation npon the decision of this court in "the Haynes 
case''. 
1t 1s true that in the Haynes case this Honorable 
Conrt (lid consider on the frzcts there presented the con-
stitntionalit;; of the inclusion of ;mch premium payments. 
Tt will be remembered that in the Haynes case this 
lf onora hie Court sai(l that there either the premi'mts 
w0y·e r0eeived only on a ~mle of the ores or were received 
only after the ores had been converted into the equivalent 
of money; and therefore the subsidies were properly 
treated as part of the proceeds from the mine. 
In the Haynes case no question of subsidies other 
than premiums payab1e under the initial quotas estab-
lished was presented. The court did not then have, as it 
now has, the full story of the basis on which subsidies 
were paid; the determination and revision of quotas, 
the reports reqnired from each individual mining com-
pany showing its own costs of operation and planned 
developn:ent; the elaborate calculations by the federal 
agencies required to estimate the subsidies needed to be 
made to each mining company in order to make up 
the deficits over and above the amounts receivable from 
mine operations and permit of continued operations; the 
times and conditions of payment, as for instance, retro-
active payments to make up for increased labor costs; 
and the reduction in quotas and consequently in subsidies 
paid when either through increased production or re-
duced costs a mine more nearly carried itself. 
Upon the records here presented, it is submitted 
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that premium payments, so-called, made under the au-
thority of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 
anthorizing the making of snbsidy payments when neces-
~ar.\· to ohtain maximum necessary production of any 
commodity, are clearly no part of the amount received 
on either a sale of ores, or on the conversion of ores 
into the equivalent of money. On the contrary, the sub-
f;idies were what had to be added to all such receipts to 
TH'nnit of continued mine operation. 
\Vp submit that the question of the constitutionality 
ol' tl1P inclm.;ion of such subsid~· pa~'ments in the measnre 
of value should be reviewed and considered by this Hon-
orablE> Court. N mv that tlw true nature of the subsidies 
is diselosc<l to this eourt, it would well appear that they 
were no more a part of the valu.e of each mining property 
than a $f:I.OO bount;· for killinp; the animal would re-
make the coyote's $1.00 pelt into a $G.OO value. True, 
tlw owner-killer mir~ht realize $6.00 by collecting the 
hounty and selling the pelt to the furrier; but the pro-
eeerls from the sale of the pelt would remain the same, 
hP the bounty what it may. 
He::.;peetfully submitted, 
CHENI1JY, MAHR, \VILKINS & CANNON, 
Attor·neys for Cl1iP.f Consolidated Mining 
Company and Un/ited 8tatP.s Smelting 
Re finlin,r; and Mining Company 
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Attorneys for Park Utah Consolidated 
Mines Company 
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